Abstract: In this paper, the effect board evaluation has on the board's composition and work is studied. Board evaluation is considered vital for the development of the board's work, which in turn is essential for the development of the company. The study is performed on companies listed on the NASDAQ OMX Nordic list and the Oslo Stock Exchange as a questionnaire study, where the chairperson was asked to grade (on a scale from 1 to 5) how satisfied she/he was with the different aspects of the board's composition and work. Of the 157 responding chairmen, 120 (76%) were chairing companies that employ a board evaluation process. The chairperson was often the key person in these evaluation and most of the evaluations are delivered verbally to the nomination committee. Of the 120 companies with board evaluation, 20 companies use only informal discussions as the evaluation method. The remaining 100 use at least one of the methods: individual open/anonymous questionnaire or interviews. Furthermore, the responses were tested with ordered probit model for the effect of board evaluation on the board's composition and work. The results show that board evaluation affect positively, according to the chairperson perception in all asked aspect (with one exception) of board's composition and work, with significant results in four aspects: first, better decision-making; two, better discussion of short-term development; three, more actively discussion of business strategy; and four, better understanding of non-financial objectives. Last, the results of the study do not show that board evaluation affect the company's financial performance (proxy with Tobin's Q, ROA or ROE).
Introduction
A board of directors is the unit of a company with external responsibility for the company's activities. Board members are elected at shareholder meetings and given power and duties by laws, company charter and other directions set forward at shareholder meetings. The board of directors is the guardian for shareholders, in order to address the principal agent problem stemming from the separation of ownership and control. This separation creates information asymmetries, which may lead to company management (agent) decisions that are focused on the managers' own interests. These interests likely differ from the interests of the shareholders (principals), who have maximizing company value as their primary objective. This difference in interests means that the managers need to be monitored, often resulting in high agency costs. Because the ownership in listed companies is de facto dispersed, shareholders cannot monitor the managers themselves but instead need to employ someone who can. The shareholders elect board members to do just this -monitor the managers (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976; and Fama and Jensen 1983) . The board also has a vital advisory role to the management in making strategic decisions (Pfeffer & Salanicik 1978) .
Even if the CEO, employees, control systems, strategic plans, and other components of a company's future success are evaluated on a regular basis, the organization at the top -the board of directors -is not automatically subjected to review. On the contrary, Korn/Ferry's Annual report of board of directors (2007) shows that less than half of the "premier organizations" in the U.S. employ board evaluation of individual directors on a regular basis.
In Japan, the evaluation rate is 30 percent, whereas it is 75 percent in the U.K. In addition, 96 percent of directors of U.K. firms believe that directors should be evaluated on a regular basis, where the figure for U.S. directors is 76 percent. The conclusion of the study by Korn/Ferry (2007, p. 11) when it comes to board evaluation is that " [u] nfortunately, assessments of individual board members, when they happen, infrequently lead to change."
In the U.S. only 40 percent of the respondents saw any changes in the board as a result of board evaluation. In the U.K., the comparable figure is 67 percent.
In all five Nordic countries, nomination committees are mandatory for listed companies. 1 Usually the committee is established by the board of directors and is commonly dominated by its members. In Sweden, however, the law specifies that the mandatory nomination committee of a listed company should consist of representatives of the three largest shareholders.
2 Carlsson (2007) describes the Swedish system in which the nomination committee, consisting of owner representatives, reviews the board's performance and nominates new candidates.
This study adds findings to previous research by offering deep insight into the consequences of board evaluation. The study does this by asking the chairman of listed Nordic firms about their perception of the board's composition and work. Previous studies are mostly theoretical, with no real data on what the consequences are of board evaluation, instead these previous studies do state based on experience that board evaluation will improve the board to become more effective (Conger, Finegold, and Lawler, 1998) ; other claim that board evaluation is a positive thing for the board and its work (Conger and Lawler, 2003) .
This study will statistically test what the consequences of board evaluation are, based on the chairpersons' responses. The study is performed in three parts: the first part will with descriptive statistics describe the frequency of board evaluation, who implements the evaluation, the methods by which board work is evaluated, etc. In the second part it is tested what the consequences of board evaluation have on the board's composition and work. Here, the Chair considers the board, with board evaluation, to have broader composition as well as better network of contacts. Furthermore, the ´chairman believe that the board have better broad composition, better networks of contacts, better decisionmaking; better discuss short-term development; more actively discusses business strategy; better understanding of the company's non-financial objectives/qualitative. The third part 1 If the company chooses not to install a nomination committee, the company must explain its rationale.
2 The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance was introduced as compulsory on the OMX Stockholm Stock Exchange in mid-2005. The Code specifies that the nominating committee shall have at least three members.
The majority of committee members should be independent of the company and its management. The Chief Executive or other members of management should not be a member of the committee. At least one of the committee members should be independent of the voice in the company the largest shareholder or group of shareholders who together management of the company.
tests the financial outcome of board evaluation against Tobin's Q, ROA and ROE, however with no significant findings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a discussion of previous research and development is provided. In Section 3 a description of the sample and data used in the study and the empirical model is presented. In section 4, the results of the study are presented, and in Section 5 the conclusions of the study are drawn.
Previous Research
The board of directors consists of individuals elected by the shareholders at a company's general meeting. The board of directors fulfills a special role according to laws and regulations, but also according to the specific company's charter and other instructions. As in all organizations, the duties of the board may be performed ineffectively. Therefore, different means are developed to make the board more effective; board evaluation is one such mean. No single process for board evaluation exists. As with all evaluations, the evaluator must study the organization and/or the individual board member's role. Knowing the responsibilities, the evaluator then must set up measurable variables to be used in the evaluation (Van Den Berghe and Levrau, 2004) Ram Charan (2005) claims that the U.S. boards were "ceremonial" boards, existing only to perform obligatory duties, before Sabanes-Oxley (SOX) was adopted. Charan states further that SOX "liberated" the board from CEO dominance, thus allowing the board to become active. Charan also outlines a third phase in which the board takes shape as a team and When introducing the idea of board evaluation to a board, the primary obstacle is convincing the board members themselves that an evaluation is necessary. Conger and Lawler (2002) point out that this is not always an easy task, because it means that high profile board members will be evaluated. In addition, boards may be reluctant to introduce evaluation, as comments from one individual concerning a peer board member may lead to conflict in the board's future work. Because each board member bring her/his special competence to the board, assessing an individual's contribution may be difficult in a broadly-based evaluation.
Some members may also question the fairness of evaluating busy board members who only participate in the board on a part-time basis.
The second step establishing a board evaluation process is deciding how the evaluation should be performed. Should the entire board be evaluated as a single unit, or should each board member be evaluated individually? Conger and Lawler (2002) claim that the initial focus of the evaluation should be the board's performance as cohesive unit, which should serve as the starting point for an appraisal. When the board feels ready, it should then move on to peer evaluation -what each individual board member contributes.
Hypothesis 1: Board evaluation contributes positively to the composition and work of the board.
Hypothesis 2: Board evaluation contributes positively to corporate financial performance.
Why we have Board Evaluations
An evaluation is usually made based on a review, and the purpose of the review is to have a "quality control" on advancement within the company, so that improvements can be made. Conger, Finegold, and Lawler (1998) point out that the board evaluation can help the board become more effective by clarifying the responsibilities of individuals and of the group. The evaluations can help improve the working relationship between a company's board and its senior management. The evaluations can also ensure that there is a healthy balance of power between the board and the CEO. Conger et al. also point out that dismantling the process is more difficult when the appraisal process is in place. This arrangement will make it more difficult for a CEO to dominate the board or to avoid being held responsible for poor performance.
A board evaluation examines the board and the work it performs. In the past 10-15 years, board evaluation has emerged as one of the most frequently requested processes, not only from shareholders, but also internally from the board members themselves (Long, 2006; Schmidt and Brauer, 2006) . The board evaluation aims to influence the board's ability to perform its roles in an efficient manner. Long (2006) points out that the board evaluation process should be tailored to the company and its specific situation, considering such factors as company lifecycle, corporate structure, board culture and embedded processes.
The competition for good board members is tough, and by evaluating directors who have already proven themselves, companies may scare away good candidates. This is something Conger and Lawler (2003) consider, when they conclude that evaluation of the performance of individual directors is a positive thing for the board and its work. Board evaluation is a mechanism to plainly define performance expectations for the board. Kazanjian (2000) also points out that the board evaluation should also bring up issues that otherwise would not be considered. The board evaluation is the only time the board asks itself what it contributes to the company's overall effectiveness.
How Board Evaluation are Performed
Board evaluation may be performed in many different ways. However, the evaluation should always be presented and discussed with the board before its implementation. The evaluation can focus on the Board as a whole or on each director individually. The evaluation can be conducted by the Board itself or by an external evaluator. The evaluation method may be a written questionnaire, a group discussion, or one-on-one interviews. Furthermore, the format may change from one year to the next for the same board (Van Den Berghe and
The most basic form of board evaluation occurs when the Chair asks the board for its opinion (i.e., informal discussion). Other commonly used forms are interviews and questionnaires held with each board member. The questionnaires may be open or anonymous (Kiel et al. 2005) . The outcome of the evaluation always depends on the board members' willingness to critique and propose changes to the board's work. Much of the board members' reluctance to participate may be tied to who performs the evaluation. The evaluation is commonly implemented by the Chair, an external consultant, or a designated board member (Anderson, 2006) . Stybel and Peabody (2005) try to identify the most effective way to evaluate the board.
Stybel and Peabody point out that board evaluation is sensitive for the members, because their reputation is one of the two things an individual risks when serving on the board.
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However, the reputation risk may be handled through unique evaluation depending on the company and situation. Stybel and Peabody identified four approaches used by the studied boards. The four approaches were based on the junction of two variables: data-collection methodology and confidentiality of data. four building blocks: 1) the addressee, the individual or group who will receive the results of the evaluation; 2) the agent, the person who will perform the evaluation; 3) the evaluation content, the aspects of the board that should be evaluated; and 4) the evaluation modalities, the methods of implementing the evaluation. 3 The other "personal risk" being "financial risk" from a lawsuit of malpractices.
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The four approaches to board self-evaluation are the following: 1) informal, 2) legalistic, 3) trusting, and 4) systematic. 5 The four board evaluation systems are the following: 1) board-to-board, 2) board-to-market, 3) market-toboard, and 4) market-to-market.
In a case study, Miller (2008) examines the board of an aged care organization, which initiated board evaluation based on sound governance principles similar to those used in the private sector. Miller concludes that the board successfully established the evaluation while maintaining the company's cultural identity.
The Consequences of Board Evaluation
For the evaluation to be valuable to the company, it has to produce some sort of outcome.
The outcome may be that the Chair provides input on how to improve board work. The evaluation can also be forwarded to the nomination committee, so that the committee members can evaluate which members should stay on the board and which competencies should be added. The evaluation may be presented either verbally or in writing.
Furthermore, the nomination committee may review, if such materials exist, results from of the internal questionnaire and/or the external report (Daily and Dalton (2003) ).
As its primary purpose, a board evaluation gives the board a chance to reflect upon and assess their strengths and weakness. To obtain maximum benefit from the evaluation, the board must take time, as a whole, to digest the results and then agree on follow-up actions or changes that will increase the board's effectiveness. Further evaluation can reveal skills that should be added to the board; the nomination committee can use this information. In addition, evaluation provides the opportunity for the Chair of the Board to have his or her leadership assessed. The evaluation thus provides the Board with a yardstick that can be used in shaping the board's future work (Charan, 2005 from Jukka Ruuska, then-CEO of OMX, as well as a questionnaire and a self-addressed envelope to return the questionnaire to OMX. The cover letter explained the nature of the study and also assured the anonymity of responses. The initial mailing was complemented by reminders, which were sent out between January and April 2008.
In June of 2008, the study was extended by adding all 188 companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange to the study. The sole mailing to this constituent was sent in June 2008. With the addition of the Norwegian companies, the total number of companies in the study was 780.
The response rate was as follows: performance ROA is applied. ROA is the return on total assets from the last full accounting year. A dummy (Sector) is included the industry of the firm, here, the sample is divided into two groups: financial and non-financial companies.
In the study the following ordered probit models with robust standard are used:
where BoardChar is a vector of board characteristics (Board_size, Female_BM_YN, Chairman_tenure, and Chairman_age), FirmChar is a vector of firm characteristics (Own_5_largest, Ln_turnover, ROA, Sector), and Board_evaluation is a dummy for whether the board is evaluated yearly or no.
The Results of the Study
The replies on the questionnaire show that 76 percent of the company have some type of yearly evaluation of the board work and the board members. The country with the highest evaluation rate is Finland with 100 percent, followed by Sweden with 84 percent, Norway with 65 percent and Denmark with 58 percent. See Table 3 . Table 4 .
It should be noted that the responding Chair may select more than one of the given responses.
TABLE 4
With respect to how the board evaluation is performed, most Chairs answer that the evaluation is performed through `informal discussions´. Here, 59 Chairs replied that their board used that method for board evaluation. Of the 120 companies with board evaluation, 20 companies use only ´informal discussions´ as the evaluation method. The remaining 100 use at least one of the methods: individual open/anonymous questionnaire or interviews.
Also popular were `Individual anonymous questionnaire' (51 respondents) and `Interviews' (45 respondents). Informal discussions are particularly popular in Denmark and Norway. In Sweden, `Individual anonymous questionnaire´ is the method used most often to evaluate boards. See Table 5 .
Also on this question, the responding Chair had the opportunity to indicate more than one of the given answer choices. it has a nomination committee, and less than 10 percent in Denmark have one. See Table 6.   TABLE 6 Eight of the responding Chairs reveal that results of the board evaluation are not reported to the nomination committee. Most of the Chairs report the result of the board evaluation verbally to the nomination committee (72 responses), which is also the most common way to report in all countries with respondents (no answers on Iceland). The second most common way to report to the nomination committee is in writing (40 responses). Some
Chairs also indicate that they report to the nomination committee by giving them an `Account of internal questionnaire´ (28 responses) or that they give the nomination committee a copy of the external report (22 responses). See Table 7.   TABLE 7 Although a nomination committee is mandatory in all five Nordic markets, not all companies have one. Those that do not must explain their rationale for this. On average, the chairs are more than pleased with the nomination committee. In Sweden, the number of observations was 55, with an average pleasure of 3.71. The average of the Finnish chairs is slightly higher, with an average of 4 with 14 observations (see Table 8A ).
TABLE 8A
Here, there are only 12 observations, but satisfaction with the nomination committee (average 3.83) seem to be in line with the satisfaction of companies with board evaluation.
The standard deviation is slightly higher for companies without board evaluation (see Table   8B ). The results indicate that there are significant difference (1 percent level) between the two groups when it comes to the chairman's perception of the board's broad composition, how the board makes decision, and the board's clear understanding of non-financial objectives/qualitative. It is significant at the 5 percent level when it comes to how actively the broad discuss business strategy. At the 1 percent level six aspects of board composition and work are significant. The aspects are: adequate knowledge about current financial issues; sufficient network of contacts; the board's discussion of short-term development; the board's discussion of long-term development; how actively the board reviews the business plan, strategy, objective and budget; and whether the board's work is carried out efficiently.
See Tables 9A and 9B. TABLES 9A and 9B.
In the second step of the statistical evaluation: an ordered probit model tests whether the variable Board evaluation has any effect on the board's composition and work. The results are in line with the expectations in that Board evaluation has a positive effect on board's composition and board work. The results of the study show that in three out of five aspects of board's composition board evaluation has a positive effect on board's composition:
significant for broad composition and sufficient network of contacts (see Table 10 ). Further, in nine out of the ten board work aspects the Board evaluation effect positively how the chair perceives the board's work (see Table 11 ). In four of the aspects the results is significant: first, better decision-making; two, better discussion of short-term development;
three, more actively discussion of business strategy; and four, better understanding of nonfinancial objectives. No significant results were found in the results testing Hypothesis 2, whether Board evaluation had any effect on firm performance.
Conclusions of the Study
The results of the study unveil that board evaluation is quite common on companies listed The results of this study clearly develop previous studies on board evaluation in this study has dwelled into in what way board evaluation effect board work, if any. The results are also confirmed by a similar study on football clubs (Brunzell and Söderman, 2012) . In that the results of the board work of football clubs are also affected positively by board evaluation. APPENDIX 1. The questions from the survey included in this study. Descriptive statistics are reported for the listed firms in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (the "Population", a total of 780 firms), which were targeted in the survey (i.e., whose Chair of the Board received the questionnaire). Also statistics for responding firms (the "Sample", a total of 157 firms) is reported. The firms are divided into Financials (banks, investment and insurance companies) and Nonfinancials, based on the sector codes used by the OMX exchanges and Oslo Børs (both use same ten categories). Averages, medians, standard deviations, and the number of firms for which the financial information item has been obtained (" Obs") Table 11 . Determinants of chairman's opinion of board work
The table reports estimated coefficients and p-value (within parentheses) as well as goodness-of-fit statistics from regressing, in ordered probit models with robust standard errors, chairman responses on different questions concerning the quality of board work (on a scale from 1, lowest, to 5, best), on a set of determinants. Absolute values of p-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
